Judith Butler — a severe case of postmodern mumbo jumbo
27 Jul, 2025 at 16:30 | Posted in Theory of Science & Methodology | Leave a comment
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The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.
At first glance — as with so many other postmodernists’ texts — one might perhaps be impressed by the avalanche of words. To yours truly, however, it comes across more as pretentious ‘polysyllabic verbiage’.
Reading Judith Butler feels like deciphering IKEA instructions penned by a poetic robot having a nervous breakdown. Nonsense on stilts. Blah blah blah and more blah blah blah.
While the most immediate threats to science today stem from short-sighted politicians slashing research budgets, we must not overlook the corrosive influence of postmodernist academia. Postmodernist thought that trades in radical posturing while peddling glib, unserious analysis diverts attention from the urgent task of building a rigorous, evidence-based social critique. The Enlightenment project—with its commitment to empirical truth, reasoned debate, and the relentless testing of ideas against reality—remains indispensable. Without these foundations, progressive criticism collapses into demagoguery or empty intellectual trends.
Postmodernism’s allure lies in its veneer of subversiveness, but its actual effect is to paralyse critical thought. By recasting objectivity as an illusion and truth as a mere social construct, it leads well-intentioned scholars into dead ends: relativistic word games, and fashions that prioritise ‘cleverness’ over clarity. Worse, it actively undermines the possibility of a coherent progressive politics. How can we challenge power structures if we dismiss the very tools needed to analyse them—facts, logic, and evidence?
Many scholars who embrace postmodernism, social constructivism, and poststructuralist relativism consider themselves part of the political left. There is no inherent flaw in research guided by political commitments. Yet no matter our personal political sympathies — as scientists, academics, or engaged citizens — we must resist letting ideology distort intellectual rigour. Simply adopting the language of radical critique does not equate to meaningful political engagement.
The allure of ‘deconstructing’ truth, dismissing objectivity, and reducing knowledge to power struggles may seem subversive, but in practice, it often leads to intellectual dead ends. Slogans dressed up as theory, fashionable jargon masquerading as insight, and a reflexive scepticism toward evidence do nothing to advance concrete social change. Worse, they divert energy from the hard work of building a substantive progressive politics — one grounded in empirical reality, logical coherence, and actionable analysis.
Genuine radicalism requires more than contrarian posturing and muddled reasoning. If the left is to offer a compelling alternative to entrenched power structures, it cannot rely on obscurantist thinking or relativistic platitudes. Social progress depends on our ability to distinguish fact from fiction, to marshal evidence in the pursuit of justice, and to articulate a vision of a better society that is both critical and coherent. Postmodern nonsense — however fashionable — does little to advance that endeavour.
That postmodern phrases bounce around the academic world like passwords at seminars and such does not, in itself, matter much — beyond the irritation they cause. The real damage begins when those phrases start to erode the seriousness and rigour of scholarly historical work …
If researchers within the scientific community themselves dissolve the boundary between individual and world, between observer and the observed, between fiction and knowledge, they not only make their own internal discourse less meaningful — if not meaningless — but also risk eroding the support they have so far been able to count on from citizens in the surrounding society. For why should these citizens contribute tax money to an enterprise whose representatives openly declare that they themselves do not believe in the possibilities of science? Why indeed?
We as scientists carry a profound and unavoidable responsibility. The pursuit of knowledge is not a neutral or abstract activity — it affects lives, shapes societies, and informs political decisions. With that power comes an obligation to seek truth and remain accountable to the public good. This ethical foundation stands in sharp contrast to the core assumptions of philosophical postmodernism.
Postmodernism, in its radical form, undermines the very idea of ‘objective truth’. If all truths are merely narratives and all knowledge claims are equally contingent, the authority of evidence collapses. In such a framework, pseudoscience and conspiracy theories become as ‘valid’ as rigorously tested scientific theories.
The radical relativism associated with postmodernism erodes public confidence in science. When scientists are framed as just another group with an agenda rather than as seekers of reliable knowledge, their capacity to inform policy diminishes.
While science must remain open to critique and aware of its own limitations, it cannot abandon the aspiration to truth without losing its purpose. The scientific enterprise depends on the assumption that the world is, to some extent, knowable — and that it matters to distinguish between better and worse explanations.
The ethical responsibility of scientists — to speak clearly, act conscientiously, and pursue ‘truth’ — is fundamentally at odds with the kind of philosophical postmodernism that denies objectivity altogether. If everything is interpretation and nothing is true, then nothing is worth defending. But science, done well, is worth defending. And in today’s world, it is more necessary than ever.
