Miles’s Custom AI Summarizes His Proposal for a Public Contribution Program — Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

Here’s a synthesis of Miles Kimball’s case for a “public contribution program” (PCP)—his proposal to expand the nonprofit sector in place of expanding government—drawing on his reader’s guide and every linked, relevant post, plus later cross-references on the blog.

Kimball’s PCP is a donor-directed, mandatory giving scheme that pairs a surtax with a 100% credit for qualifying gifts to nonprofits. In his canonical sketch, marginal tax rates would rise by 10 percentage points on income above about $75,000 per person (or $150,000 per couple), but every dollar of that surcharge could be fully offset by making “public contributions”—donations to high-quality nonprofits that do things government could legitimately do and that can substitute for government spending. This is deliberately narrower than the ordinary charitable deduction; it focuses giving on government-like functions so the program meaningfully relieves budget pressure rather than merely subsidizing any charity. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

Kimball stresses that the PCP doesn’t replace the entire public sector. Defense, minority protections, and other core state functions remain governmental, while the PCP shifts marginal resources—especially in social services, research, foreign aid, and eldercare—toward regulated nonprofits. Eligibility rules (set by normal democratic processes) can exclude, for example, elite cultural institutions that primarily serve the rich (“opera houses”) while allowing faith-affiliated service nonprofits to qualify. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

In his reader’s guide, Kimball offers six core reasons to prefer nonprofit provision where feasible:

1. Decentralization → creativity. A more diverse set of decision-makers, with competition and experimentation among organizations, yields more innovation than centralized bureaucracies.

2. Easier sunsetting. Funding shifts away from failed or ineffective programs when donors lose confidence—much harder inside government.

3. Lower cost. Nonprofit wages are typically lower than government pay (outside highly skilled roles), so comparable services are cheaper.

4. Lower distortions. Even when giving is required, choosing where to give is more pleasant than paying taxes, cutting tax-avoidance behavior and its deadweight loss.

5. Altruism amplification. Cognitive dissonance works in society’s favor: people required to give come to see themselves as givers; they talk about choices with friends and bring up children in a culture of giving.

6. Civic education. Thinking about public-goods tradeoffs teaches citizens about policy; people become more informed and engaged. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

Kimball anchors this case in John Stuart Mill’s defense of doing “many things outside of government.” Mill warned that enlarging the state needlessly concentrates talent and power in bureaucracy, dampens independent civic capacity, and reduces the competitive scrutiny governments need to perform well. The PCP’s mixed system—some collective rules, lots of individual choice—preserves freedom and pluralism while still getting public goods funded. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+2Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+2

The PCP is Kimball’s answer to the long-run collision between aging-driven spending and political resistance to higher taxes. He argues we will need more revenue; the question is how to raise it with the least harm. His principle: “No tax increase without recompense”—if we must raise taxes, give taxpayers something they like in return. Here, the “something” is the power to direct the extra money to vetted nonprofits rather than to the general fund. This makes hikes more politically tolerable, reduces tax avoidance, and lets us take care of the poor, sick, and elderly without mechanically expanding the state. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

In his Quartz pieces bringing the PCP to a broader audience, he frames it as the alternative to the false choice of austerity vs. spending: shrink government’s footprint while still getting the job done via “a thousand points of light” in the nonprofit world. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

To count toward the 100% credit, a donation must:

• Go to a nonprofit meeting high quality standards;

• Fund activities that could legitimately be government functions; and

• Substitute, to an important extent, for spending governments would otherwise likely do.

He illustrates likely high-priority PCP areas: poverty relief and social services, scientific and medical research, foreign aid that reaches people rather than regimes, and eldercare that helps seniors remain at home. By design, the program crowds out some regular charitable giving (which actually boosts net revenue) while crowding in focused, substitutive giving. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

Although religious congregations as such would not qualify (to preserve the “legitimate government function” standard), many affiliated service nonprofits could. Cultural institutions mainly serving the wealthy could be excluded; legislators would draw and adjust the boundary through ordinary democratic rulemaking. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

Kimball thinks a PCP would tilt resources toward areas that current democratic budgeting under-prioritizes—science and foreign aid—while accepting that government likely remains better at national defense and certain minority-protection priorities. He envisions more total resources for the most humane objectives, because the program makes paying for them less painful and more engaging. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

On the macro side, the PCP addresses debt anxieties: it lets us fund what we must without either ballooning deficits or crushing, unpopular tax hikes. And because required giving is less hated than taxes—thanks to choice and social meaning—the program reduces the social waste of tax avoidance, a classic efficiency loss Kimball wants to minimize. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

A recurring thread is that policy should work with human psychology. Kimball leans on two pillars:

• Consumption-based fairness (“Scrooge” argument). Ethically, we should tax appropriation for oneself—consumption—rather than savings that might later be donated or invested to benefit others. This perspective makes it feel less punitive to require high earners to direct resources to public purposes rather than simply remit more tax. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

• Non-monetary motives. People care about status, gratitude, community, and meaning. Building those into tax design (inspired by Scott Adams’s essay on how to tax the rich) softens resistance to contributing more and channels ambition into public-spirited action. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

He further argues that the PCP cultivates character: via cognitive dissonance, required giving nudges people to see themselves (and their children to see them) as contributors; they’re then more likely to volunteer time as well as money. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

Kimball’s blog proposes and stress-tests the mechanics:

• Rates and base. The headline illustration is +10 percentage points on income above $75k per person (or $150k per couple), fully creditable with qualifying gifts. He notes policymakers could cap how much surtax can be offset by contributions, if desired, to reduce perceived advantages for the very rich while still requiring broader participation (so the program actually funds enough). Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

• Eligibility & oversight. A regulator (using familiar nonprofit oversight) would certify organizations and police mission drift, ensuring activities genuinely substitute for government functions. Rules can evolve democratically; mixed systems aren’t inherently less legitimate than fully centralized ones. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

• Interaction with current programs. Do not cut direct public programs until decentralized efforts clearly cover specific areas. The PCP is additive at first, creating overlapping coverage and learning; then government can pare back where nonprofits have proven capacity. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

• Tax interaction. Because PCP gifts are narrower than general charitable giving and labeled as substitutes for government spending, they crowd out some ordinary donations (which raises revenue relative to a simple deduction expansion). That’s intentional, so the PCP relieves the budget. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

“Democratic priority-setting is better and more legitimate.” Kimball’s reply: a hybrid of democratic rulemaking (to set eligibility and guardrails) plus individual choice (to allocate within those bounds) is not less legitimate—and often better in creativity and accountability. Mill’s deeper worry is that overgrown states weaken the citizenry’s capacity to act independently; cultivating a vigorous civil society is itself a democratic good. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

“This empowers billionaires.” The PCP broadens directed giving beyond the ultra-rich; it requires higher earners—not just plutocrats—to either pay the surtax or direct it to vetted public-purpose nonprofits. Kimball embraces philanthropic pluralism while keeping the state as gap-filler for things that aren’t natural donation magnets. He also points to scholarship rebutting broad-brush critiques of mega-philanthropy. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

“Won’t people game it?” International analogs show design pitfalls and fixes. Japan’s Hometown Tax (a donor-choice system for local governments) spurred big flows, but in-kind gifts created perverse incentives; Japan eventually restricted gift values. The lesson: no rebates-in-disguise, clear caps/criteria, and administrative simplicity matter. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

Kimball’s lists are suggestive, not exhaustive:

• Poverty and social services. More nimble, locally adapted help; easier to scale what works and sunset what doesn’t.

• Science & medical research. Systematic under-prioritization in politics could be redressed by donor enthusiasm.

• Foreign aid to people (not regimes). Funds can flow directly to effective implementers.

• Eldercare innovation. Cheaper, better in-home supports to delay nursing-home entry. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

He repeatedly frames these as areas where nonprofits can beat government on cost and speed while remaining regulable for quality and equity. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal

A subtext through the posts is changing the emotional valence of fiscal policy. Taxes are hated not only because money is taken, but because government monopolizes the choice of how it’s used. The PCP returns choice—within democratic rules—so the same dollars buy more goodwill, less evasion, and richer civic participation. It’s a way to meet Republican goals (smaller government, lighter coercion) and Democratic goals (robust care for the vulnerable) simultaneously. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

Miles Kimball’s blog builds a coherent, multi-layered case: fiscally, the PCP is a pragmatic release valve for long-run budget stress; politically, it is easier to swallow than plain tax hikes; institutionally, it cultivates a stronger civil society; behaviorally, it harnesses non-monetary motives; ethically, it aligns with consumption-focused taxation; administratively, it’s feasible with existing nonprofit oversight; and strategically, he urges a gradualist rollout—prove what nonprofits can do before trimming overlapping government programs.

If we must raise more money, raise it in a way people can love, or at least like—by letting them direct it to public purposes. That’s the essence of Kimball’s PCP. Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal+1

Sources (key posts, in Kimball’s own taxonomy):

Where Kimball revisits and elaborates (e.g., his Feldstein critique and 2021–2024 course pages), the arguments are the same spine: decentralize what we can, regulate it well, and use tax design that people won’t fight—to fund more of the public goods we actually want. Confession