Walking the talk? Green party politicians and pollution patterns
- Michael Koetter and Alexander Popov in this ECB paper argue what happens when Green Party is elected to power. Do they walk the talk?:
- Climate change is a global challenge that society expects to be addressed by elected politicians, primarily those with an explicit environmental agenda. But do these ”walk the talk” once elected? Theory suggests that the answer is far from clear. Acting to reduce industrial pollutants that have immediate adverse effects on human health is an example of local politicians dealing with an environmental issue that is in line with local preferences. In contrast, reducing emissions that contribute to slow-moving climate change but have no immediate health effects via policies that burden consumers and firms may not be in the best interest of the local constituency. Rational local politicians voted into office with a ”green” agenda may therefore abandon or at a minimum dilute their initial sustainability objectives
- We mobilize three decades (1990–2018) of hand-collected data on the electoral performance of the Green Party across 542 counties and 16 federal states in Germany. Germany is a perfect laboratory to answer the question whether stronger revealed green preferences spur a green transformation, for three reasons. First, voters’ environmental preferences map clearly into party representation, with environmental politics being the Green party’s central theme since its foundation in 1980. Second, the available data makes it possible to observe ata granular level in an industrialized emissions-intensive economic structure not only election results, but also various pollution patterns. We split the latter into those that represent an immediate health hazard (Total Suspended Particulates (T SP ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide (SO2), and carbon monoxide (CO)) and those responsible for long-term climate change (carbon dioxide (CO2)). Third, the federal structure of German politics with party representation at various levels of government helps us better isolate whether, and at what level of government, Green Party representation affects industrial emissions.
Interesting to see this granular data.
Findings:
- Our first result is that if the Green Party gains influence in local elections, both local hazardous emissions and emissions responsible for global warming decline. A representation of the Green party at the state level, in turn, is only accompanied by a reduction in CO2
emissions. - Second, we find evidence that only CO2 emissions per unit of output decline when the Green party is represented in local and state politics. While this effect is statistically weak, it indicates that Green politicians ”walk the talk” and promote the adoption of cleaner technologies.
- Third, the economically more meaningful mechanism appears to be a general output reduction in particularly carbon-intensive industries once the Green party representation is non-negligible at the local and at the state level. Once again, there are important differences at local versus state level of government. When the Green Party is strong at the local level, output declines in industries that emit both locally hazardous pollutants and greenhouse gases. In contrast, output in agriculture – a sector that emits only greenhouse gases but no pollutants hazardous to local health – declines only when Green politicians are represented in State government.
- In addition to informing the debate on the costs and benefits of political centralization, our findings also have implications for the optimal policies aimed at addressing global warming. Unlike the smog from coal plants which plagued large global urban centers for centuries and galvanized the early ”green” movement, anthropogenic greenhouse gases create a global externality with limited immediate impact on local health.
- Our evidence makes a strong case for global coordination of climate policies, and simultaneously cautions against the notion that such policies can be pursued at no cost to economic development.
