Postmodernism — nothing but obscurant nonsense on stilts
25 Jan, 2026 at 11:03 | Posted in Theory of Science & Methodology | Leave a comment
Among the soft obscurantists some aim at truth, but do not respect the norms for arriving at truth, such as focusing on causality, acting as devil’s advocate, and generating falsifiable hypotheses. Others do not aim at truth, and often scorn the very idea that there is such a thing. By assumption, these non-respecters of truth cannot be reached by argument, only by ridicule …
Let me mention who they are, by discipline and by name. Disciplines include deconstructionism, postmodernism, subaltern theory, post-colonialism, queer theory, gender theory. Some names are Jacques Derrida, Bruno Latour, Gayatri Spivak, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Homi K. Bhabha, Judith Butler.
At first glance, one might be impressed by the avalanche of words in postmodernist texts. To yours truly, however, it seems more like pretentious polysyllabic verbiage. Reading Judith Butler, for example, feels like deciphering IKEA instructions penned by a poetic robot having a nervous breakdown. It is nonsense on stilts.
While the most immediate threats to science stem from short-sighted politicians slashing research budgets, we must not overlook the corrosive influence of postmodernist academia. Postmodernist thought, which trades in radical posturing while peddling glib, superficial analysis, diverts attention from the urgent task of building a rigorous, evidence-based social critique. The Enlightenment project — with its commitment to empirical truth, reasoned debate, and the relentless testing of ideas against reality — remains indispensable. Without these foundations, progressive criticism collapses into demagoguery or empty intellectual fashion.
Postmodernism’s allure lies in its veneer of subversiveness, but its actual effect is to paralyse critical thought. By dismissing objectivity as an illusion and truth as a mere social construct, it leads well-intentioned scholars into dead ends of relativistic word games and styles that prioritise cleverness over clarity. Worse, it actively undermines the possibility of a coherent progressive politics. How can we challenge power structures if we abandon the very tools needed to analyse them — facts, logic, and evidence?
Many scholars who embrace postmodernism, social constructivism, and poststructuralist relativism consider themselves part of the political left. There is no inherent flaw in research guided by political commitments. Yet, regardless of our personal sympathies — as scientists, academics, or engaged citizens — we must resist letting ideology distort intellectual rigour. Simply adopting the language of radical critique does not equate to meaningful political engagement.
The allure of ‘deconstructing’ truth and reducing knowledge to power struggles may seem subversive, but in practice it often leads to intellectual dead ends. Slogans dressed up as theory, fashionable jargon masquerading as insight, and a reflexive scepticism toward evidence do nothing to advance concrete social change. They divert energy from the hard work of building a substantive progressive politics — one grounded in empirical reality, logical coherence, and actionable analysis.
Genuine radicalism requires more than contrarian posturing. If the left is to offer a compelling alternative to entrenched power, it cannot rely on obscurantist thinking or relativistic platitudes. Social progress depends on our ability to distinguish fact from fiction, to marshal evidence in the pursuit of justice, and to articulate a critical yet coherent vision of a better society. Postmodern nonsense — however fashionable — does little to advance that endeavour.
A left that abandons reason and objectivity disarms itself in the face of oppression. The stakes are too high for lazy thinking.
These stakes extend beyond academia. A world without shared standards of truth is one where propaganda thrives and solidarity fractures. To defend reason, intellectual rigour, and objectivity is not reactionary; it is a radical act. These values allow us to distinguish critique from conspiracy, justice from jargon, and liberation from self-indulgent cynicism.
We as scientists carry a profound and unavoidable responsibility. The pursuit of knowledge is not a neutral activity — it affects lives, shapes societies, and informs political decisions. With that power comes an obligation to seek truth and remain accountable to the public good. This ethical foundation stands in sharp contrast to the core assumptions of philosophical postmodernism.
Postmodernism, in its radical form, undermines the very idea of ‘objective truth’. If all truths are merely narratives and all knowledge claims are equally contingent, the authority of evidence collapses. In such a framework, pseudoscience and conspiracy theories become as ‘valid’ as rigorously tested science. This radical relativism erodes public confidence; when scientists are framed as just another faction with an agenda, their capacity to inform policy is fatally diminished.
While science must remain open to critique and aware of its own limitations, it cannot abandon the aspiration to truth without losing its purpose. The scientific enterprise depends on the assumption that the world is, to some extent, knowable — and that it matters to distinguish between better and worse explanations.
The ethical duty of scientists — to speak clearly, act conscientiously, and pursue truth — is fundamentally at odds with a postmodernism that denies objectivity altogether. If everything is interpretation and nothing is true, then nothing is worth defending. But science, done well, is worth defending. And in today’s world, it is more necessary than ever.
