If the inflation of President Trump’s ego was any indication at the C5+1 summit at the White House last week that brought together the US President with the five presidents of Central Asia, big things are coming to the region.
“You are a great leader, a statesman sent from above to restore common sense and the traditions that we all share and value,”Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said of Trump.
“No other president of the United States of America has ever treated Central Asia the way you do,” Uzbek leader Shavkat Mirziyoyev told Trump, adding that he was “the president of the world” and that “in Uzbekistan, we call you the president of peace.”
For his part, Trump called Central Asia “an extremely wealthy region.” He was referring to its natural resources, specifically rare earths in this case.
And while rare earths were largely what garnered the coverage—the meeting was more about pumping up a new US and allied push into Central Asia in order to strike a blow against Russia, China, and Iran.
The U.S. signed deals with Kazakhstan (which also joined the Abraham Accords), Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on natural resources, Boeing planes, Starlink, and AI. The moves come at the same time that the European Union is doubling its efforts to gain more of a foothold in the region.
At the gathering Trump remarked that “Sadly, previous American presidents neglected this region completely.”
That’s not exactly true. The US has made previous attempts to become a larger player in the region.
As Ben Godwin, head of analysis at PRISM, a strategic intelligence firm in London, told RFE/RL:
“In the 2000s, it was the War on Terror and oil and gas. Then there was a decarbonisation era where many new projects in Central Asia were centred around renewable energy. Now it’s the role of critical minerals in national security.”
The problem is always staying power. Russia and China have geography on their side, as well as economic advantages and expertise in areas like rare earths. As we noted on Monday, the idea that the US is going to be competing with China on rare earth processing and refining in a year’s time is magical thinking.
While the US alone cannot compete with Moscow and no one can with Beijing in Central Asia, there are numerous players and factors involved. And as we’ve been reminded in places like Ukraine and the Caucasus, a nation’s economic self-interest is not always a guarantee of the path it will choose.
So as we’ll show below, Russia and China have the upper hand in more ways than one, but also have cause for concern—one of the biggest centers on the great ambiguity on the Bosphorous: Turkiye and its push into the region under the cover of Turkic brotherhood.
The Turkish Trojan Horse and Western Push in Central Asia
We’ve long been pointing out that despite friction between Ankara and Tel Aviv, Turkish-US-NATO cooperation was always present under the surface and picked up steam with the toppling of Assad in Syria.
Erdogan continues to cooperate with the US and Israel in Gaza.
We also just discovered that former NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg and Erdogan had/have a “bromance.” Who knew?
But while so much attention on the resurgent partnership between Ankara and Washington/NATO is focused on Ukraine and the Levant, eastwards into the Caucasus and Central Asia is just as important.
The Cradle recently described Turkiye’s Gaza push as “proxy politics under US watch.” A similar dynamic is at play from Azerbaijan to Kyrgyzstan where the two sides’ interests overlap.
If there is any winner of the Trump Route of International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), it is Türkiye. Ankara views the corridor that cuts across southern Armenia, and for all intents and purposes links Azerbaijan and Türkiye, helping to expand its influence to the Central Asian states. And as the US and EU pour money into Central Asia in an attempt to reorient its alignment westwards Türkiye will play an outsize role. There is a problem, however.
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign minister has made it crystal clear today that Iran will not accept any changes to the Armenian southern border and that it will not tolerate any foreign forces there. pic.twitter.com/6HjlRYHiKB
— Seyed Mohammad Marandi (@s_m_marandi) November 6, 2025
But will Tehran intervene militarily to stop it? They may be faced with that choice before too long.
Arguably a much more consequential meeting than the C5+1 summit in Washington took place a month ago in Baku, Azerbaijan at the 12th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States.
It was there that Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan agreed to deepen cooperation across a range of areas, including trade and logistics—which would sideline Russia and increase cooperation with the EU—and defense cooperation, including joint military exercises.
And last week Baku also hosted a NATO delegation as it transitions to alliance standards and deepens cooperation with the Turkish military.
Around the same time that Türkiye was heading up the OTS meeting, the country’s lawmakers were encouraging NATO to take a heavier hand against Iran with all the usual strategies of sanctions, deterrence, and weakening Iranian “proxies” across the Levant.
A report authored by members of the main opposition party in Türkiye and presented at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Ljubljana alleges that Iran’s nuclear program, support for terrorism, military cooperation with Russia, and ties to China hurt Euro-Atlantic security.
While Erdogan was denouncing the genocide in Gaza, Türkiye over the past year has been steadily increasing its involvement in Western, including the launch of launch of a joint venture between Turkish drone maker Baykar (run by Erdogan’s son-in-law) and Italian defense contractor Leonardo, which has very close ties with Israel.
Of particular interest to Türkiye is expanding its access to the EU money dispenser whirring for rearmament. The two sides recently held defense talks after a three-year pause. At the end of October Türkiye and the UK signed a multibillion-dollar deal for the sale of 20 new EF-2000 Eurofighter Typhoon jets, which is a big deal for Türkiye as it looks to get its indigenous fighter jet program off the ground.
Türkiye certainly has agency, and Erdogan’s ruling elite have ambitions to resurrect the country as a world power, but for now both Iran and Russia view Ankara’s eastward moves as a trojan horse for the US, UK, and NATO. For now at least, it is a marriage of convenience. As Ali Nassar writes at The Cradle:
It reveals a layered geopolitical project anchored in Pan-Turanist nationalism, Muslim Brotherhood-aligned political Islam, and strategic deployment of military and development tools – crafted to serve Ankara’s national interests while converging with NATO’s broader regional goals.
…Pan-Turanism, an early 20th-century ideology premised on the unification of Turkic-speaking peoples from Anatolia to western China, has been resurrected in Ankara as a vehicle for geopolitical consolidation. Today, Turkiye deploys this vision to deepen its grip on Central Asia – particularly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan.
This ideological push is operationalized through the Organization of Turkic states, which functions as a joint political, economic, and security bloc linking Ankara with these post-Soviet republics.
Türkiye and the West also have visions of using the TRIPP as an energy corridor to send fossil fuels and other resources from Central Asia and the Caspian westwards while cutting out Russia and Iran, all the while increasing their footprint in these countries, effectively carving out a chunk of the Eurasian “heartland.”
Resurrecting the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (or Tanker Fleet)
Notably, Türkiye and Turkmenistan recently halted gas exports via Iran following the reverberations from the decision by Washington to block Iraq from importing gas from Turkmenistan via a swap deal with Iran. Now the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline—or transport via tankers— is back on the radar after years of technical, legal, and political obstacles. From Eurasianet:
The possible ramifications of the US [Iraq] block appear to have been understood by Ashgabat. Speaking at the 5th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum on October 22, Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov confirmed that Ashgabat is committed to reviving the “Silk Road” concept of transiting gas from Central Asia to Europe.
“Turkmenistan has always emphasized the great importance of the Western direction, specifically the creation of a stable energy corridor along the Caspian Sea-South Caucasus-European route,” he said.
There are signs too that Azerbaijan, through which any Turkmen gas exports to Türkiye and Europe would have to transit, is open to the idea.
Baku’s strategy has always been to prioritize the development and export of gas from its own reserves. However, efforts to boost gas output from its giant Shah Deniz gas field and Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field have yet to bear fruit. Azerbaijani officials accordingly have confirmed they will be unable to double gas exports to Europe to 20 bcm per year as promised to the European Union.
One reason Azerbaijan isn’t going to be able to fulfill that demand is because Russia is no longer laundering as much gas through Azerbaijan to the EU due to Western-supported friction between Baku and Moscow.
Back to the grand plan to replace it:
Additional volumes of Turkmen gas, then, could help Baku ultimately meet its delivery commitments.
If all sides are on board with a trans-Caspian pipeline, investors would be more likely to consider financing for construction, as well as the necessary expansion of capacity of existing lines through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye to Europe. Gas could also potentially transit via a pipeline built along the envisioned Armenian-Azerbaijani land corridor, dubbed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.
And so here we start to see the grand design come together. It would be a strange economic decision, but those seem en vogue these days.
A Trans-Caspian route would also upend Kazakhstan operations by Western majors like Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell, which already play major roles in Kazakh oil; the problem apparently is that more than 80 percent of it moves through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which delivers crude via pipeline through Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The pipeline has continued operating through three years of war and it by all accounts a good deal for all involved.
But Nurul Rakhimbekov, the Founder and President of the DC-based think tank Center for Global Civic and Political Strategies, writes that it’s not safe. As evidence, he cites the fact that in February and October of 2025, drone strikes on the pipeline infrastructure threatened supplies.
Who was behind the strikes? NATO-backed Ukraine, of course.
Supporters of the Trans-Caspian route envision it linking up with a new pipeline through TRIPP or the existing Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that runs from Azerbaijan to Türkiye via Georgia and then onto Europe. Rakhimbekov writes:
The BTC route offers a secure, Russia-free pathway from the Caspian to the Mediterranean, connecting Kazakhstan’s oil to markets in Europe and Israel via Türkiye’s port of Ceyhan. It also dovetails neatly with Western efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy corridors.
Unlike the congested Black Sea route, BTC provides stable access to global markets and reduces insurance and logistics costs that have been driven up by regional instability. Technically, a trans-Caspian connection — whether through a growing tanker fleet or a future subsea pipeline — could handle 50 to 60 million tons per year, matching the CPC’s capacity and giving Kazakhstan more control over its own export future.
The diplomatic groundwork for this shift is already in place. Washington and its allies have expressed broad support for Kazakhstan’s diversification strategy. The next step is execution.
The tanker fleet comment is interesting. There are reasons why the pipeline hasn’t been built, chief among them that the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea signed between Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan didn’t solve disputes over submarine cables and pipelines.
Those are governed by the 2003 Tehran Convention, which stipulates environmental standards. Moscow and Tehran repeatedly invoke the Convention to effectively block the construction of pipelines between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
A tanker fleet could be a different story (although it could face challenges posed by climate change shrinking the sea, including already 50 kilometers off the coast of Kazakhstan).
Sure, it wouldn’t make economic sense, but then again it would mirror Europe’s energy strategy for the past four years. And it would cut out Russia and Iran and serve as a”Western connection” into Central Asia.
Notably, the heads of state at the C5+1 endorsed the development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route.
Europe is piggybacking on these designs with its own visions—all green of course. While Brussels supports the Trans-Caspian pipeline—or tankers— it’s also moving forward with plans for the Black Sea Green Energy Corridor, which would see power mostly generated from “renewables” sent from Azerbaijan and Georgia to Romania and then elsewhere in the bloc. That corridor could then link up with a trans-Caspian power line connecting Azerbaijan with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Concern in Moscow and Tehran (and Potentially Beijing)
A.V. Ananiev, former Senior Counsellor at Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, writes:
It is clear that the goal of the OTS is to create a Turkish, rather than a Turkic world, and to remove regional leaders from direct power, transferring their duties and responsibilities to supranational officials, following the example of the EU. To achieve this, it is necessary to focus not only on cultural and economic issues, but also on the development of military capabilities…The OTS activities are a cause for concern, considering that the organization has a number of post-Soviet states among its participants, including those that are also members of the EAEU and the CSTO. Türkiye is forming this institution to increase its influence in the region, while the member states are trying to use the OTS to balance their relations with other countries.
Yet economic ties between the OTS remain small while Russia and China still act as primary trading partners. But that doesn’t seem to be the same brake that it used to be. Armenia and Azerbaijan are to varying degrees dependent on Russia economically. The Central Asia states are too. Yet they all seem willing to put the relationship at risk. A partially befuddled Andrew Korybko recently tried to make sense of it:
…partially driven by the aforesaid fear that they have of Russia, they might have conceivably assessed – whether on their own, through consultations with one another, and/or with the assistance of the West – that a window of opportunity has opened to maximally “hedge their positions.” TRIPP is the logistical means for doing so, which would be complemented by the planned PAKAFUZ railway between “Major Non-NATO Ally” Pakistan and Central Asia if Afghan-Pakistani ties ever improve like Trump wants.
The shared development that Putin proposed during the Second Russia-Central Asia Summit in early October shows that his country recognizes these new challenges and is ready to compete with the West. Nevertheless, it might not suffice for preemptively averting the security threats that could materialize as a result of Turkiye spearheading the spread of Western military influence into this region. Russia’s brightest minds like Bordachev should therefore prioritize the formulation of a supplementary policy.
Still, at the same time Russia is facing challenges, Türkiye is trying to capitalize.
Following the OTS meeting, Türkiye simplified its employment rules for citizens of Turkic-speaking countries so that they can now work and conduct business freely in Türkiye without obtaining citizenship or special permits.
That move came as Russia is getting rid of 700,000-plus migrants, mostly Central Asians, a process which was jumpstarted by the terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall in outer Moscow in March 2024. Four Tajik men are on trial for the attack. And Central Asian states are frustrated with the current treatment of migrants in Russia.
The West is attempting to weaponize the issue. Mikhail Borkunov writes:
This is also evidenced by some of the materials recently released by pro-Western media agencies. Take, for instance, the article on “How Moscow’s Xenophobic Migration Policy is Impacting Relations with Central Asia” published on the Carnegie Politika website on October 1.
…The “analysis” reveals that Central Asia has long been discontented with the authorities’ failure to address the anti-migrant campaign allegedly initiated by Russia. The example of Baku has shown that such sentiments should be used to advantage rather than ignored. According to this account, Azerbaijan has stood up for its citizens by engaging in a conflict with the Kremlin.
Inspired by Baku, Central Asian states have allegedly set out to openly condemn the actions of the RF authorities and reconsider their relations with Moscow for the first time in many years.
Borkunov does admit that Russia’s migration policy is becoming more strict—not to be unexpected when it’s facing a full-scale, sustained destabilization campaign that has already seen terrorist attacks that took advantage of its Central Asia borders.
In fact, Moscow’s migration policy is gradually transitioning to a new level, as the Concept of State Migration Policy for 2026-2030, approved on October 15, 2022, focuses not on increasing the population through Central Asian citizens, but on strengthening control, digitalization, and the task of attracting only those migrants who share the “traditional spiritual and moral values” of Russian society.
And so Central Asian states are looking to redirect migrant workers elsewhere, especially to Europe, China, and the Gulf.
Speaking of the latter, big money from the Gulf is also starting to flow into Central Asia with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar upping their presence in Central Asia. Over 2020-2024 trade increased 4.2 times in five years to $ 3.3 billion, with investments rising to $ 16.2 billion.
Along with infrastructure and energy projects, Turkish influence and Gulf monarchy money can also lead to other “projects”—namely what Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi calls “CIA Islam”— which is of concern to Russia, Iran, and China.
China Fills the Vacuum, Not the West
With Russia under siege and preoccupied by Ukraine, it would seem to be an opportune time for the US and friends to move into Central Asia, but it is China that is only increasing its dominance there. Even with money coming in from the Gulf, China dwarfs all other players. Its investment in Central Asia hit $25 billion in the first half of 2025 alone. Even The Telegraph admits this:
Back in 2000, Russian trade with Central Asia outstripped Chinese trade with the region more than five-fold. Since then, Chinese trade with Central Asia has soared, accelerating after the launch of Beijing’s so-called “Belt and Road Initiative” in 2013 before rising even faster over the last three years, since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Chinese trade with the region is now more than twice that of Russia.
With Moscow distracted and America’s Central Asian military bases closed since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing has filled the vacuum – not only securing more resource deals with Central Asian nations but also engaging in a frenzy of infrastructure construction across the region to make sure China, whatever the geopolitical weather, can keep transporting goods to and from Europe and global markets.
Or keep itself supplied in case of any US-led shenanigans.
The Central Asian states, meanwhile, look to play balancing acts with all sides and avoid being dominated by the two Asian powers. In that sense, it’s logical that they would court involvement from the US and look to the OTS for strength in numbers.
The problem for such countries is that while Russia and China look to appeal to economic mutual interests, the other side has all tools on the table. More than competition on an economic playing field, that means weaponizing migrant issues, regime change, terrorism, and getting others to do their fighting.
Even if the West were to be successful at building infrastructure that helps the Central Asian states balance energy and mineral deliveries between China and Europe, it’s unlikely Washington would ever be satisfied with such a win-win arrangement. Instead there would be attempts to export destabilization into Russia and China’s Xinjiang region and beyond.
We’ll see if this go-round the US finds more success in the region. After all, the past decade has only brought failed coup attempts, an Afghanistan retreat, and a lot of talk but no action on the Trans-Caspian pipeline.
