Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times,
The 2023 implosion in the Atlantic Ocean of a submersible, which killed five people, could have been prevented, the U.S. Coast Guard said in a report released on Aug. 5.
The company that operated the Titan sub, OceanGate, failed to adhere to its own safety standards and did not encourage employees to raise concerns without fear of retaliation, according to the 327-page report.
“Instead, the company’s systemic failures created an environment where risks were ignored, and consequences were inevitable,” it said.
The report of investigation (ROI) included recommendations on improving oversight of subs, which authorities say will make the operations safer.
“This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,” Jason Neubauer, chair of the Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation probe into the implosion, said in a statement.
“The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence.
“There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework. I am optimistic the ROI’s findings and recommendations will help improve awareness of the risks and the importance of proper oversight while still providing a pathway for innovation.”
Lawyers representing OceanGate in a legal case filed by the family of one of the people who died in the implosion did not return an inquiry.
OceanGate went into the sea on June 18, 2023, off the coast of Newfoundland. The implosion left all five people on board dead.
For years leading up to the event, OceanGate used intimidation and the company’s reputation to evade scrutiny by regulators, according to the Coast Guard. That left it able to operate Titan “completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols,” the report said. OceanGate executives ignored crucial inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance, which led to the implosion, according to the report.
The faulty actions included using just four bolts to secure Titan’s 3,500-pound dome to the sub despite the design calling for 18 bolts, according to the report. OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who died in the implosion, was quoted as saying fewer bolts were used “because it took less time.”
Rush cofounded OceanGate with businessman Guillermo Sohnlein, who left the company before the implosion. Sohnlein testified in the Coast Guard inquiry that the company used carbon fiber for Titan because it wanted a cheaper, lightweight material. He said he did not dive himself in Titan because he did not want to take space away from others and that Rush wanted to go himself because, he told Sohnlein, “if anything happens, I want it to impact me.”
OceanGate employees also spoke to investigators. One, who served as the company’s director of engineering, said that a crack in the carbon fiber hull of Titan was covered up by Rush, who did not want to disclose it to the public and later came up with false explanations for the crack, including that a lightning strike caused it.
OceanGate later fired the director.
OceanGate ultimately built a new Titan using a new carbon fiber hull, but the design and construction featured flaws that weakened the structural integrity of the sub, the Coast Guard said. The implosion was caused by a loss of structural integrity of the hull, the Coast Guard determined. The people on board were exposed to nearly 5,000 pounds per square inch of water pressure, resulting in their instantaneous deaths.
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